PARTICIPANTS
Mark Brisley
Managing Director and Head of Dynamic Funds
David Fingold
Vice President & Senior Portfolio Manager
Mark Brisley: You're listening to On the Money with Dynamic Funds, the podcast series that delivers access, insights, and perspective from some of the industry's most respected active managers and thought leaders. From market commentaries and economic analysis to personal finance, investing and beyond On the Money covers it all because when it comes to your money, we're on it.
Welcome to another edition of On the Money with Dynamic Funds. I'm your host, Mark Brisley. I'm joined today by David Fingold, Senior Portfolio Manager here at Dynamic who manages over $13 billion in assets across our platform and mutual funds and ETFs that span global and U.S. and international offerings. The last time David joined us for On the Money was back in March of 2022. The subjects we were talking about then are probably the subjects we'll still talk about today but it sure seems like in a different way. We covered inflation and interest rates, gas prices, yield curves. I think we can jump into all of those things today, so welcome!
David Fingold: Thank you.
Mark: Let's talk about the yield curve first and just before I jumped into it for our listeners, there's a lot of discussion about the particular subject in the news and in the media and if you're watching business television, in basic terms, when shorter-term government bonds have higher yields than long term, that's known as a yield curve inversion, and it's often one signal of a future recession. To start things off, the U.S. yield curve right now is at its most inverted level since 1981. Is that a sign in your opinion that investors see a recession on the horizon? What scenarios are you looking at in terms of potential recession?
David: The yield curve inversion can resolve itself in a recession, that is possible. In the circumstances where that happens, you get a bull steepener as short-term interest rates fall and the curve steepens. What is interesting about this though, is that technically, I don't believe you have been in danger of recession, in most instances while the curve is inverted. A lot of economists will actually correct people and say, it's the moment when the yield curve becomes very steep because the Fed has stepped in and they've cut rates very aggressively, likely because they've seen something negative that that's actually very near the date that the National Bureau of Economic Research says that the recession has started.
You aren't usually in recession while the curve is inverted. It's usually in the bull steepener. The other thing that can happen is what's called a bear steepener, where long-term rates rise and steepen the curve. I don't know whether or not that will happen in this instance, but that can happen and that usually happens when one avoids recession. Then we get to the question of, will there or won't there be a recession? I think that the obvious answer is yes, recessions are inevitable, just like death and taxes. The question is, is it going to happen in the next 12 months? I'd say that the odds are above average.
That being said, we did have two negative quarters in the first and second quarter, then I believe we had a positive quarter. It's entirely possible the recession is in the rearview mirror. You also have the possibility that a recession started at the beginning of the year because you can get positive quarters in a recession. In which case and a lot of people, I'd say this is the consensus view that we're in the middle of a recession that ends on June 30th of next year. What I would say to that is, we need to be looking forward because it's entirely possible the recession is over. It's also entirely possible that we are already in the thick of it.
If the recession is going to end June 30th of 2023, the market will begin looking forward during the second quarter of 2023. I think it's also important for us to face forward. I think that the recession news was news that we should have been paying attention to late last year. I think that now we need to be thinking about what happens next.
Mark: Seems like we might have a bit of a theme here with key investment, where to start with, including the word investment, inflation, and interest rates have also just been so hugely topical and felt by mainstream consumers all over the world. Maybe we'll start with inflation and some of the indicators that we often talk about and one of those is watching retail gas prices over the last month. We've actually seen that prices in the U.S. are down 40 cents a gallon that's the lowest they've been since January, that should be a positive sign to the consumer. We talked about that's one of the first indicators that maybe inflation is starting to stabilize. What are your thoughts on the impact of that on the markets and in these price declines?
David: We have maintained that inflation is always transitory and the reason why that is the case is that when you have a very strong inflation number, and then you have to compare against it sequentially and year over year the number tends to fall. We got as high as single digits. When you get numbers like that, it sets up a very high base effect against which you're going to dis-inflate. It did prove to be transitory. We were hoping it would roll over earlier, but we got the supply disruptions in food and energy that were driven by the conflict in Eastern Europe and that put off the peak in inflation and perhaps drew us towards a higher rate for this point in the cycle.
That's set up very tough comparisons and now we're significantly dis-inflating on things like food and energy. You're quite right that it's very bullish for the consumer and we can see that in consumer confidence. You have an environment where gasoline and food prices have moderated, and the employment situation is extremely strong and you don't have many people entering the workforce and you have a lot of unfilled openings. That suggests the consumer should continue to be strong.
This is something that fits in nicely with the theory that the recession was in the first half. Even if part of the recession remains ahead of us, it does mean that a lot of the pain for the consumer and a lot of the pain for the economy may be behind us and that, we need to be thinking about the end of it. The other thing I'd say about inflation, and this is important, is that outside a recession, it's probably unlikely to be headed below two at this point. It's entirely possible that as much as nine was not sustainable, that maybe instead of two being sustainable, we need to be thinking more about three or four.
I believe I mentioned a moment ago that the people that are entering the workforce are a significantly smaller number than the amount of job creation. That suggests that the employment cost index and unit labor costs, which are important forward-looking indicators for the Fed on inflation will be stronger than expected. We should all be thinking about as we invest what are investments that make sense at a 3% or 4% long-term inflation rate as opposed to the 2% that we had been focused on.
Mark: Let's add in then to this discussion, the subject also of interest rates. Another I word. We've very clearly seen that central banks have been raising rates all year to tame inflation. We've been through this period of time over the last several years we talked about a lower for longer rate environment. Now it seems like we're talking about higher for longer. How's this impacting how you manage portfolios? Do you think about the rate environment right now?
David: First of all, that it's probable that the lows for interest rates generationally are behind us. When you think about it, the 10-year bond yield went to less than 1%. To be blunt, it came pretty close to being zero. If it wasn't the lows for this generation for interest rates, then it means we need to be thinking about negative long-term interest rates. I don't think that anybody is. Interest rates have inflected very strongly off the bottom of the cycle levels. They have reached a level at which there's a considerable amount of demand by pension funds, for instance, to immunize interest rates have found the top of their range and pulled back a bit.
The losses in fixed income and I think that I'm correct in saying that in the first half tied the record from one year during the 19th century, so we probably have already seen the peak of the losses and the peak of the volatility and interest rates at least for this cycle simply from the viewpoint that they were so elevated on a basis of more than 100 years that they're very likely to get lower. In terms of how we manage money, I guess the number one implication would be to ask whether or not we should own bonds because if rate volatility is going to fall, then one of the reasons why we've avoided long-term government bonds perhaps is being removed from the table.
The issue though, that we're left with is they don't appear to be acting in an inversely correlated manner with equities. If the long-term government bonds are not hedging or exposed equities, then we only have to look at what the upside is on them to decide if they make sense. At this point, they don't make any sense. Now, if we get into a situation where we start getting equity market corrections, where bonds provide a counterweight versus equities, then we're going to take that seriously and we're going to go back to them.
When we move over to the area of corporates, I'd say my biggest single concern is that because the Fed intervened in credit markets and stopped credit spreads from blowing out bargains were not created in 2020. Even today, corporate credit is very compelling for pension plans to immunize. Corporate credit is very well bid. To be clear, it is just a lower beta form of equities. If I want to take any given unit of risk and invest it, I'd rather invest it where there's potentially unlimited upside, which is true of equities. With fixed income as you know, the upside is always finite because you can only receive your principle on your coupon strips and perhaps your best-case scenarios, a call at 105. Also, you do have a risk to the downside because a bond can default. In my estimation, if I'm just looking to spend a unit of risk in the construction of a portfolio, I'd rather go to the equity of a well-financed, well-managed company because there's no long-term limit on its potential return.
Mark: From your perspective, what are you finding to be your greatest challenge in a climate like this? Is there anything in particular that stands out over many years of doing this?
David: The biggest challenge is always managing our emotions. As you were running through your question, I was thinking of the Ned Goodman quote, "Nothing has changed, psychology remains." We do deal in an environment where we are swayed constantly by fear and by greed. It is very important in the art and science of portfolio management. I'm quoting David Goodman when I say it that way, that we manage our emotions and remain emotionless in our investment decisions. Then we have the challenge of maintaining a collegial environment for the team. That is to have emotions and to be able to support our other team members and our friends and to leave the emotionless behind the office when we go home and we have our family and we have our friends, and we have our community involvement.
These are things that never change. It is not easy to do. If I was to try to guess what drives so many people to stop doing this and have seen people leave this industry, it is not easy to do. One of my big challenges supervising several portfolio managers and analysts is to help coach them to make good business decisions, to do it without emotion, and then to be human beings when they're not making investment decisions.
Mark: You referenced Ned Goodman, he had another quote too, which was that he's an optimist because he'd never met a rich pessimist. I think you believe in that same saying. What has you optimistic based on the comments you just made?
David: Everything is going to get better in the world. For whatever reason, people have stronger memories of what is unpleasant. Things like bear markets, like the one that we may well be in, they have stronger memories of the unpleasant than they do of the pleasant. When we step back and we look at the mountain chart, when we step back and think about the long-term investing environment, bear markets are much shorter than bull markets.
Bear markets end, it is entirely possible that this process that we are in began in March of 2021 with the peak of speculation in cryptos, SPACs memes moved onto blue-chip securities at the end of 2021, and it will end. We need to be thinking about the future because when it's over, there's going to be new leadership within the market, and we want to own that new leadership. We are optimistic about the businesses that are well-positioned to be the new leadership.
They are generally industries that did not do well in the prior 10 years. Ned would say that when a cycle ends, its leadership will likely never leads in the next cycle. That the leaders of the next cycle perhaps come from the industries that underperformed in the prior cycle. When we look for, we're optimistic about many industries. That includes insurance, it includes pharmaceuticals, it includes the defense industry, it includes capital goods, it could include energy, it could include certain parts of base metal mining.
What all these areas have in common is that they did not do well in the prior 10 years. They have been doing very well through this bear market and their areas that we're underinvested in where we need these goods and services in our daily lives and the demand is not disappearing and the market will just simply shift the capital away from the industries where everybody has agreed that they've already done well towards the areas the people have forgotten about because that's just the normal course of things.
Mark: Can you talk about a little more detail what you mean by this new leadership in the markets and where you're currently finding companies that meet your bottom-up investment criteria?
David: Let's think about what happened in 2000s for a moment. As everybody is aware, technology did very well during the 1990s and ultimately there was a technology bubble that peaked around March of 2000. I think that what people forget about that is that it had fundamental underpinnings. That is technology spending as a percentage of GDP was growing in the '90s and technology spending as a percentage of GDP peaked when GDP peaked in 2000, so you had a combination of an industry that had done very well for 10 years and justifiably so, but it attracted a premium valuation and then moved into a decade where people were very surprised to find that the demand for technology does not grow like a tree to the sky.
That sometimes it underperforms the economy. For several years at a time, it was considered unthinkable, and if you go back and look at the bear market from 2000 up until early 2003, what you'll see is that most of the damage in that bear market was basically concentrated in technology media and telecom but the industries that became new leadership, and I vividly remembered Ned and David Goodman talking about the new leadership from financials, oil, and gas and mining that were emerging in the 2000 to 2003.
That the money was gravitating towards those industries and out of technology and then as those three years of the bear market passed the leadership industries did not make new lows. Whereas the former leadership that had, unfortunately, become a loser ship kept on making new lows until the market bottomed so it's very important to identify this. Ned was always very clear that during bear markets it's when new leadership articulates itself.
We all know that technology did very well during the 2010s. If you go back and look at what happened in the 2008 bear market technology outperformed the S&P 500. It was a negative number, but it still went down less than the S&P 500 and that was technology articulating its leadership in the 2008 bear market, and we clearly saw that leadership play out during the 2010s. I cannot be for certain that there was a bubble in technology during the 2010s. There is some evidence that that might have been the case.
It became over 30% of the S&P 500 and any industry that has ever done that in the past has then moved into a lost decade. That's what happened to technology post-March 2000. It's what happened to Energy post the peak in 1980. We call it the curse of the 30, so there likely will be a leadership alternation. The other thing I want to say about it is it does not make technology a no-fly zone.
If you go back and look at technology during the 2000s, what you will see is that it was the names that had become very significant weights within the technology index that were the ones weighing upon the technology index. There were companies that were emerging leadership within technology that did very well and I think anybody who wants to understand that should go look at how well Apple did in the period from 2002 up until 2008.
That would be a great example of a company that people had forgotten about that emerged as a leader, and again, I'm sure that there were a lot of disruptive small-cap growth companies that our growth team was in touch with that did well during the 2000s, but an indexed approach to technology in the 2000s was a mistake. A closet-indexed approach to technology was a mistake. We can see right now that there are incumbents within technology that are being disrupted. It is my belief that there are companies that will do well within technology during the next decade, but it's possible that none of them are the names that led in the 2010s.
Mark: You've made the comment, this environment, it's a recipe for active management and I think you just stated that with respect to technology. Can you elaborate a little bit more on that?
David: Yes. When we go and we add up the industries that we would say right now are below their long-term demand trend and have improving fundamentals, or if we were to go technically and look to see which industries have the best breadth and we added those industries up, we only get 30 or 40% of the S&P 500.
We can see some strength in materials and energy and financials and healthcare and in industrials, and when we add them all up, it's not enough to propel the index to new highs perhaps over the next decade. The exact same thing happened in the period after March of 2000, and the exact same thing happened in the period after 1972. You end up with the capitalization-weighted indices concentrated in the companies that succeeded in the past, and there could be nothing wrong with those companies, but they could be too expensive, or their growth could be slowing.
Some of them are going to be companies that are going to get disrupted and may not exist 10 years from now and the money is shifting towards new leadership. When you get this recipe where 60% or 70% of the averages are tied up in what are potentially yesterday's businesses, the market tends to get range-bound for a decade so to be clear about this, the market is going to return to its prior highs. It did during the '70s. It did during the 2000s. In fact, it did it repeatedly during the '70s.
It just couldn't set a new high because the money was rotating from yesterday's leaders to the future leaders. Also, to be clear about this, there may be nothing wrong with some of the companies that are prior leadership. Go back and look at McDonald's during the 1970s. Nothing happened to change the investment hypothesis. It was just too expensive in 1972 and it spent a decade consolidating and then it grew very nicely when its evaluation became attractive in 1982 when commodity prices fell and the consumer had more spending power so there may be really good companies that are going to continue to grow, but their valuations may compress in the next decade.
This is a fantastic recipe for active management. Dynamic was basically born to live in these kinds of environments, in the 1970s and the 2000s. Those range-bound markets are time periods where most Dynamic Funds would call them their golden era so I understand that I'm talking my book when I say this is possible, but we do see the recipe for it and it means that indexing could be a terrible mistake during the 1970s and during the 2000s.
You went absolutely nowhere, but you got all the volatility and then you have the issue of closet indexing because the closet indexing is not a victimless crime. You have a tremendous opportunity cost because you're tying up capital in yesterday's companies and that capital could have been invested in new leadership and when I say yesterday's companies, again, I'm not talking about disruptive innovators here. We're not talking about taking risks. We're talking about blue chip companies, dividend-paying companies that underperformed in the prior decade and their valuations became attractive. They kept on growing and now the market is realizing these are places people should invest.
Mark: One of the tools that you have at your disposal, David, as an active manager, is your ability to have a higher weighting in cash and I don't think you see a reason to do that at the moment, but can we talk a little bit about are you fully invested? Is this an environment you see yourself taking advantage of the opportunities?
David: Right now we are taking advantage of opportunities and we have put some of our cash to work. If we just took, as an example, the Global Dividend Fund, its cash weighting was in the '30s as recently as late June and early July. Its cash weighting is currently in the teens because as we saw credit markets improve, rate and currency volatility fall, and breadth improve in the market. During the period of July, August, and September, we put money to work. We feed winners, we starve losers.
A lot of the pain in the indices that has been experienced since June 30th is in the capitalization-weighted indices. It's coming from the largest names. The average stock has actually been making positive headway, so we've been taking advantage of that. Now you would ask, "Why are we not fully invested? Why is there still some cash left?" The answer is, "We are conservative and also we have not seen a climactic end to the bear market."
When I think through my experience there, it's always easy to identify the problem and to see its resolution when the bear market ends so I'll give some examples. In 2011, we had European banks go from stress test to being nationalized, and we called it a land speed record in terms of how fast it was happening. It ended with a coordinated central bank statement. In 2008, we had Lehman and AIG get resolved, and that happened at the end of September and the average stock bottomed November 20th, 2008.
When we go back to the period in 2002 and 2003, we had 911, and then the emergency Fed rate cuts after 911, and then we had the second Gulf War and the second Gulf War ended. During 1994, we had Orange County go bankrupt, and then we had the second Mexican default, and the market bottomed soon after. 1998, we learned the four letters, LTCM at the end of September 1998. There was an emergency Fed rate cut in the first week of October and that's when the market bottomed. I don't think this process has ended entirely because we can't name it. There has yet to be a central bank response. Even in 1994, which was a case of a pause, the pause was telegraphed.
Vice Chairman of the Fed, Alan Blinder, gave the New York Times interview and said that at the December meeting they would not be able to hike rates so there's been no Fed communication about their tightening process ending and there's been no whale that floated ashore like an AIG, like a Lehman Brothers or a Tyco, an Enron, a WorldCom. We can continue back through this historically. Ned told me about this.
He said he knew that we were at the low in 1974 when Penn Central failed so this whole idea of the whale washing ashore is usually the bookend as the whole crisis ends and we haven't seen it yet but just to be clear about this, if companies we like are going up and their business is getting better, we'll put the cash to work. We're not here to do macro. We're here to invest in good companies that are well-financed, well-managed, and have prospects for growth.
If we see risk increase, credit spreads spike, for instance, we'll raise cash again but we're not here to guess about macro. We're here to use macro purely for risk management because I think the alternative, the ostrich position is not something we're willing to do. I'm not prepared to stick my head in the ground.
I will look at the macro to manage risk, but I will never allow it to stop me from making a good investment decision. I remember being with the whole Dynamic team at a Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting where Mr. Buffett was asked about macro risk and he said, "Never would a macro risk ever stop him from investing in a good business." I think that that's important words for everybody too to pay attention to.
Mark: David, as a portfolio manager, you're diversified across U.S. and global geographies. In this environment, how much is your decision-making around the geographies themselves playing into your decision-making and where you're looking for opportunity?
David: Because we feed winners and starve losers. The geographic weight is generally driven by that process and then it's only limited by risk management. To be clear about this, if the only companies that we're doing well were our American companies, we would never turn a global equity fund into a U.S. equity fund because first of all, if the international markets are underperforming, they're going to inflect very strongly at some point in the future.
Second of all, we want to be respectful of advisors' asset allocation choices. If they wanted to buy a U.S. equity fund, we have a U.S. equity fund that I think they should consider so we just let it happen organically. We don't sit down and have an investment committee meeting and say, oh, we really like Japan. Let's go overweight Japan.
What we do is we say, what are the companies that are coming into our recommended list? If a whole bunch of new Japanese ideas are coming in, we will consider them very seriously. We want to see their prospects to outperform alternatives when measured in Canadian dollars and then we want to look at what our Japan weight is and say, is this an appropriate weight because things can happen in Japan?
We all remember in 2011 the tsunami and the earthquake so a single country risk is real. We will look at our Japan weight and say, is this a prudent weight? Do we have room to add if we have new Japanese ideas and we'll do it? Similarly, if Japan starts doing poorly for whatever reason, we don't know how to make money on a stock that's going down so we will reduce the Japanese content.
Will we take it to zero? It's an interesting question. I have done it before, but as it turns out, most of the time, we can always find at least one company we like in Japan. The geographic decisions are a product of the companies that enter our recommended list from our research process and then we use some risk management to make sure that if we are putting a significant over or underweight into a country that it's consistent with our views and also making sure that it isn't bringing an untoward level of risk to the portfolio.
No, we don't sit down and do regional allocation and we also strongly recommend that nobody does it because one of the things that I've come to learn over time is that when oil and gas is doing well, it doesn't matter if it's a Japanese, a European, or an American company or for that matter when exporters that price their product in U.S. dollars are doing well, they're doing potentially just as well all over the world. The idea that one can look at the world and make a call on countries, I think is an inappropriate call. I'll ask every Canadian the question, which is, if you were positive on Canada in March of 2000 and bought the Canadian benchmark, which was over 30% Northern telecom, what did that really have to do with Canada's fundamentals?
The stock market of Canada at that moment was massively underrepresented by oil and gas and mining and financials, which were the things that then proceeded to do well in the context of the Canadian economy. Every Canadian should understand that making country selection based upon macro makes no sense at all because I imagine we have all lived through Northern Telecom.
Now, as I hear myself say this, I think that in order to be registered, you have to be an adult and it's already 2022. We perhaps are in the situation where somebody is registered who is not old enough to have been alive during Nortel that I'm sure that parents and friends told them about Northern Telecom.
Mark: Thinking back to some advice I received early in my own career from a mentor, invest with people that invest with you. I think as a portfolio manager that does describe a lot about how you are structured. You're not managing your mutual funds or your ETFs one way, and then personally investing in a different way. Elaborate a little bit on how your clients truly are partnered with you in your investment process.
David: Look, this is just the way that I was brought up. I came to join what was then called Goodman and Company. I worked for founders in a family-controlled business. Their name was on the door and they were eating their own cooking. Our clients were truly our partners, and that is exactly the way that I've constructed my own business. I have no long-term investments other than the funds I manage.
I have no equity investments other than the funds I manage. I take a significant amount of my compensation and units, the funds I manage. I am truly eating my own cooking. Clients are going to get exactly the same result that I do except for one key difference, which is that I imagine the clients are more than one manager, and I do not. It doesn't make me right, it doesn't make me smart, but it does mean that everything that I've said is how I have my money positioned and I've got to wear my opinions.
If I've said anything on this podcast that offended you, I apologize. Understand it's not just hot air, it's how I have my money positioned. The reason why I'm doing it is simple. I've been a hobbyist investor my entire life. David Goodman gave me the opportunity over 20 years ago to have a professional platform that is in contact with tens of thousands of advisors across Canada.
I have the ability to invest globally, to have a team to handle tax and currency and trading all over the world. It's literally like getting recruited to race for Ferrari. What David Goodman handed me is literally like being given the keys to a race car in terms of the capabilities of what we can do with the Dynamic Fund. I'm literally getting paid to do my hobby and I'll do it until they pry it from my cold dead hands.
Mark: I'm going to end our discussion today by quoting you and ask you one final question. You recently said, "We don't like the part about losing money in bear markets, but we shouldn't lose sight of the idea that really good businesses in these environments also tend to be on sale." Any final comments for our listeners today just on dealing with the emotion and the discipline of investing in these types of market environments?
David: Well, I'd say, first of all, we're doing our best to minimize the volatility for clients. I get it that for many people they'll say you didn't do enough. All we can really do is our best. We just have to live with the fact that our best is the best that we can do. While we are currently managing risk, it is important to understand, and I'll reiterate this, the bear market will end and we will forget about this bear market.
There are tremendous opportunities created in bear markets to invest in best-in-class companies when they go on sale. When I look at the opportunities created at the end of 2018 or in the summer of 2011, the opportunities created in the global financial crisis, the opportunities created in 2002, that's when we got to go shopping for the businesses that provided us with our subsequent results.
I think that for investors, the most important thing is work with your advisor and try to understand what risk levels are appropriate for you. If you think you took more risk than you felt, you could then discuss your plan with your advisorYou can use the Global Asset Allocation Fund if you need to have the discretion for when to put the cash to work.
We also have segregated fund versions of many of our funds. If properly underwritten they provide valuable insurance benefits including but not limited to creditor protection, mortality protection, and principle protection to help investors keep their eye on the long term as opposed to being focused on the short term.
What we are doing is long-term investing by definition all the equity funds and the balanced funds are long-term investment vehicles. There are a lot of opportunities right now. I'm not telling anybody to put all their money to work right now. As I mentioned we can't even name the current crisis that we are passing through, but I think it makes a lot of sense to consider things the dollar cost averaging.
I'll remind everybody who thinks that there's an opportunity right here right now and they want to be fully invested. We have the ETFs which are always fully invested. Regardless of how your practice works or what your investment goals are we think we have an investment fund that will help fit in with your plan. If you don't agree with me we also have lots of other fine products at Dynamic.
Mark: Well, David, as always incredible level of insight and opinions and I thank you very much for your time and sharing them with us today. You've been listening to another edition of On the Money with Dynamic Funds. For more information on Dynamic, David Fingold, and our complete lineup of actively managed funds, contact your financial advisor or visit our website at dynamic.ca. Thanks for joining us.
Disclaimer: This audio has been prepared by 1832 Asset Management L.P. and is provided for information purposes only. Views expressed regarding a particular investment, economy, industry, or market sector should not be considered an indication of trading intent of any of the mutual funds managed by 1832 Asset Management L.P. These views are not to be relied upon as investment advice nor should they be considered a recommendation to buy or sell. These views are subject to change at any time based upon markets and other conditions and we disclaim any responsibility to update such views.
To the extent this audio contains information or data obtained from third-party sources it is believed to be accurate and reliable as of the date of publication but 1832 Asset Management L.P. does not guarantee its accuracy or reliability. Nothing in this document is or should be relied upon as a promise or representation as to the future. Commissions, trailing commissions, management fees, and expenses all may be associated with mutual fund investments. Please read the prospectus before investing.
The indicated rates of return are the historical annual compound total returns including changes in unit values and reinvestment of all distributions does not take into account sales, redemption, or option changes, or income taxes payable by any security holder that would've reduced returns. Mutual funds are not guaranteed. Their values change frequently and past performance may not be repeated.
